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Cl\'IL RIGHTS 
Can Public Housing Tenants, Alleging Civil Rights 
Violations, EnfoTce Federal Housing Lat.o? 
h' Dmwlas Bowman and Neal De\'ins 
. 0 
ISSUE 
Brenda E. Wright 
v. 
City of Roanoke 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
(Docket ~u. 85-5915) 
:\ rgrud Octubt•r 6, 1986 
In \\'right t•. Cit)' of Rumwhr Rl'tll't'dtJpml'llt cmd Housi11g 
;\ullmril,\', the Supreme Court will again enter the thkkt't 
of determining whether pri\'ate citizens are authuriled 
to enforce congressional mandates. Specifically, \\'right 
b c:oncerncd with the a\·ailability of relief under the Ci\'il 
Rights Stonute (42 l'.S.C. Section HlS:J, establishing a 
prh·atc right of action for "the dcpri\'ation of any rights 
scntred by law") in the face of a fairly comprehensi\'e 
enforcement scheme entrusted to the Department of 
Hnu'iing and t:rb<m De,·elopment. 
FACTS 
The t:nited States Housing Act of 193i (42 U.S.C. 
Section 143i) funds states to pro,·ide affordable housing 
for low-income families, either through constructing 
ne\\' units or rehabilitating existing but unsafe units. 
The Act is administered by the Department of Housing 
and l'rban De\'elopment (Hl'D), which has regulatory 
anct' enforcement authority. Hl'D enters into Annual 
Contributions Contracts (ACC's) with Public Housing 
Authorities (PH.-\ 's), which operate and manage the 
a'isisted housing units in a gi\'en locality. Each PHA is 
bound under its ACC to the regulations established by 
Ht:D co\'ering all aspects of housing management and 
funding. 
The specific pro\'ision of the Act at issue in this case 
is the Brooke Amendment (42 U.S.C. Section 143ia). 
This subsection pro\'ides that the rent which can be 
charged to a tenant in housing assisted under the Act is 
limited to a specified percentage of the tenant's income. 
The rent charged by definition includes an amount for 
utilities. Each PH:\ is required by HL'D to pro\'ide a 
reasonable allowance for utilities. Regulations establish 
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parameters by which to mea~urc "reasonableness" and 
require re\'isions of the allowance under specilk circum-
stances. A PH:\ has limited discretion in this area. 
\\'here a temmt's utilities are furnished b~· the PH.-\, 
as in this case, the tenant rc~ceh·cs an 111lnwance of a 
certain number of consumption units (kilowatt hour~ or 
electricity). Consun1ing more tlmn the allotted mnount 
allows the PH:\ to impose a surcharge for the O\'ercon-
sumption. \\'here the tenant pmchases utilities directly 
from the supplier, he or she recei\'es an allownnce in 
dollars which is deducted from the gross rent chm·ged. 
The tenant is responsible for ;m~· consumption abu\'e 
that co\'ered by the allow<mce. 
Brenda E. \\'right. Geraldine H. Broughman and 
Syl\'ia P. Carter, tenants in housing assiited under the 
Act, brought this lawsuit on behalf of the class of ap-
proximately 1,100 tenants of public low-cost housing in 
Roanoke. \\'right, Broughman and Carter are all from 
families of "\'ery low income" as defined by federal 
statute. All claim that the utilit~· surcharges regularly 
added to their rents strains their limited budgets: the 
surcharges sometimes ha\'e totaled nearly as much as the 
monthly rent charged and ha\'e often taken se\'eral 
months to pay off. 
\\'right and the others sued their landlord-PH.-\, the 
City of Roanoke Recle\'elopment and Housing Author-
ity (RRHA),· alleging that the RRH.-\ had \'iolated the 
Brooke Amendment and its implementing regulations. 
Specifically, they claimed that the RRH.-\ had estab· 
lished unreasonably low utility allowances. and had not 
re\'ised them, allowing surcharges to be imposed on a 
majority of tenants. The tenants alleged that they were 
thus wrongfully O\'ercharged. They based their claim on 
the Ci\·il Rights Act of 18il (42 U.S.C. Section 1983) 
and their leases with the RRHA. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment for RRH:\ 
(7i1 F.2d 833 (1985)). That court, explicitly following 
the approach in Middlm•."C Cout~l)• Sfu't'rag~ AutlroriiJ t•. 
~t.•atiol!al Sea Clammm Associalio" (453 U.S. I (1981)) and 
Ptmzhursl Slate School and Hospital v. Halclmntm (451 t:.S. 
I (1981)), made two inquiries. First, it asked whether a 
private right of action is foreclosed by the pro\'isions of 
the Act. Second, the court questioned whether the Act 
creates the kind of rights for which Section 1983 is an 
appropriate remedy-inasmuch as Section 198:1 does 
not itself confer any rights. 
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.-\s to whether the .-\ct forecloses prh·ate actinns. the 
court was unwilling to de\·iate from twn of its recent 
cases considering similar questions, Ptrry• t•. Huusiug ,,,. 
tlwrity of Cit_\' ofCimrl~stuu (664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 198 I)) 
and Plltlps t•. Housiug t\utlwrit_v ufl\'uotlniff(i42 F.2d R 16 
(4th Cir. 198·1)). which answered in the negative. Work· 
ing on the premise th<tt for the tenants to ha\'c a right of 
action, the statute must either explicitly gram that right 
or prm·ide for no other contrary enforcement mecha· 
nism, the court emphasized that nothing in the .-\ct 
explicitly granted an independent right of action to 
tenants. The court further noted th:n the Act was cle:tr 
in granting HL'D full administrath·e and enforcement 
powers-including the most effecth·e enforcement tool: 
the power to terminate funding. This combination was 
belie\'ed to be compelling e\'idence that Congress did 
not intend to \'est a right of action in the tenants, but 
rather intended fur Ht:D to enforce the regulations on 
the tenants' behalf. 
The court also found it significant that. while the Act 
confers a benefit upon the tenants, the actual assismncc 
pro\'ided goes to the st:lte, making the tenants onl) 
indirect beneficiaries. For that reason, the court con· 
eluded th<tt the Act did not create any legally cognizable 
rights in the tenants . 
.-\s to the question of whether Section 19S:l is ;m 
appropriate remedy, the court again refused tu cJe,·i:ne 
from Pllrlpf in concluding that the .-\ct does not grmu 
the kind of right for which Section 1983 pro\'ides a 
remed~·· The only stated reason for this conclusion is 
that the court considered it highly unlikely that Con-
gress intended for "federal courts to make the necessary 
computations regarding utility allowances that would be 
requirec to a(ljudicate indh·idual claims of right." This is 
apparently a corollary to the court's view that the proper 
forum for the tenants would be the state courts. There, 
the tenants might pursue a claim ba~ed on thdr lease 
with 'the RRH..-\-a remedy which was explicitl~· en-
dorsed in the court's decision. 
The tenants' claim now before the Supreme Court 
rests on two funda.nental premises. 
The first is that a private right of action under Sec-
tion 1983 is presumed to exist whene\·er a federal right 
is conferred. Under this view, the presumption can be 
overcome only by showing congressiomtl intent specifi· 
cally to deny such a right of action. 
The second is that the Brooke Amendment limiting 
the rent chargeable to tenants creates a right in the 
tenant to limited rent. This is the necessary found;uion 
of the argument that the RRHA deprived the tenants of 
their rights for Section 1983 purposes when the RRH.-\ 
allegedly disregarded regulations governing setting and 
re\·ising utility allowances. The result of the RRHA's 
action (or inaction) was that the tenants lmd to pa>· 
wrongfully imposed utility surcharges which raised their 
gross renlill charge abo\·e the Brooke Amendment ceil· 
+I 
ings. Thus it is urgc<lth;llthe RRI-I.\'s allegl·d t;•ilurc to 
comply with regulations cuncernin~ a cump"llt.'lll nf 
rental charges amounts to a deprinuiun of suhstamh·e 
rights. Under the Act. tenant!> could. by \'irtue ul' "un-
reasonable" utility consumptiun. pay murc than the 
rental ceiling e\'en if the RRHA obeyed :til rc:gulatinn". 
t:nder the tenants' cumlysis. such payment would 
amount tu a \'ulunt;u~ wai\'cr nf the right tu tht.• limited 
rent. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
As in any case which concerns implied rights nl' a<:· 
tion, Wright raises a fundamental separmion of puwers 
concern: whether implementing federallc•w is apprupri-
ately the sole pro\'ince of the Executh e. or whether 
vindicating legal rights is sufficiently impnrt;un that pri· 
\'ate law enforcement efforts are proper. An impnrt;mt 
underlying issue is the means by which the choke is 
indicated: wh.u evidence in the Jegislmh·e history or 
specific statutory language is conclusi\'e, and what if :my 
presumptions exist? While the Fourth Circuit clt>arly 
opted for the plenary Executive uuthority model. the 
tenants here argue that the effect or such an appruadl is 
to "divest public housing tenants of any me;mingful 
fedet al rights." 
The Court might suggest that low utility rates are nut 
a "right" under Section 198:!, but arc insteud a nunen· 
forceable "benefit." l'nder this approach, the issue of 
who has authority to enforce tenmm' rights would be-
come irrele\'itnt. The question of what is a reusonctble 
utility rate would simply be viewed as a policy decisiun 
left to the program's administrator, Hl'D. Such u ruling 
would h:l\'e farreaching consequences, for it would sug· 
gest that f~deral aid programs are not suhject 10 judicial 
challenge br private litigants. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Brtnda E. Wright (Coi/:L(tl of Rrcortl. He'll I)' L. l\'uudu·tml, 
312 Cll11rtll .-\t'l'llllt', 51\', RtmntJkr. ~'.-\ 2-llJ/6: lc'l.•plwlu' (i03J 
344-2088) 
l. The Brooke Amendment, as e\'idencecl by cungres· 
sional intent, \'ests public housing tenants with a 
substantive right to limited rents. 
2. The disposition belO\\' erroneous)~· reduces the avCJil-
ability of the Section 1983 remedy to cases where a 
pri\'ate right of action can be implied from a fedc:rnl 
statute. The proper approach to the preclusion in· 
quiry is a presumption that the Section 1983 right of 
action may be used to \'indicate federal rights. 
3. The Authority has not met its burden of showing 
congressional intent to O\'ercome the presumption 
that Section 1983 may be used for private enforce-
ment of the Act: Congress did not expressly preclude 
pri\'ate Section 1983 enforcement; Congress did not 
supplant Section 1983 with alternate pri\·ate reme· 
dies, and Congress' grant of general regulatory au-
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thurity to Hl'D dues not demonstrate intent to 
supphmt the statute. 
·1. The federal courts must entertain a lease-based claim 
which una\'oidably raises a substantial federal ques-
tion under the Housing Act of 19:li and the imple-
menting regulations. 
For the City of Roa11ohe Redet•elopment and Housirrg Au-
thtJril)' fCmm.frl tJf R1•cord, BCI.\m·tl £. Ht~rris, P.O. Bu.~; i2U, 
H•lllllllkt•, \',-\ 2-IOfJ.I; teleplwnt (iOJ) 982--1200} 
1. Public housing tenants ha\'e no federal cause of ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to redress individ-
ual grievances arising out or their hmdlurd's 
implementation of HUD regulations. The compre-
[,,lilt .\'u. 2 
hensh·e enfnn.:enwm '\cheme cn•med by the Housing-
Act and Hl'D sub~idy program c\'inces Congre~s· 
intent tu foreclose il Section 1 mt\ iiCtion 10 enforce 
HUD utility regulations. 
2. The claim that RRH:\ brc;~chc!l its le;~se with its ten-
ants is a chtim lor which federal jurisdiction cannot 
exist independent of this Section 1 ~8:\ claim. 
3. Damages should not be an a\':til:tblc remedy under 
Section 198:3 where the source of rcco\'er~ ''ill he 
federal grant monies. 
AMICUS BRIEF 
In Support of Brenda E. lVright 
The i':ation:tl Housing Law Pnuect 
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